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Cornhusker Economics
Further Thoughts on the Brazilian Grain Market,
Its Competitiveness and Its Challenges
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

No report –
Thanksgiving
Week

4 Wks
Ago

11-15-19

*

*

156.18

157.55

150.88

158.02

217.93

240.66

*

*

76.74

87.28

149.15

152.16

403.37

402.34

3.74

3.67

3.74

3.51

8.41

8.16

6.02

5.77

3.09

3.15

*

175.25

107.50

107.50

95.00

95.00

147.50

153.00

52.50

52.50

In previous articles in this space (on 6/20/2018 and
6/19/2019), I talked about recent developments and
challenges for Brazilian grain markets. We discussed
that one of the main obstacles for Brazilian competitiveness is the country’s logistics system. In those
articles, we focused more on transportation and
how higher marketing costs are explained by the
poor infrastructure in Brazil and the modes of
transportation used to haul grain to export ports.
Today we will talk a bit more about this point, and
then address another dimension of the logistics
challenge in Brazil.
As previously discussed, the major agricultural area
in Brazil is the center-west region, while the new
frontier that has been expanding in recent years is
the Matopiba region in the Brazilian northeast
(Figure 1). One of the greatest challenges in these
areas is transportation. Traditionally, Brazilian grain
is exported through ports in the south and southeast, which are located around 1,000 miles from
those regions. Still, approximately 75-80% of Brazilian grain is exported through these ports in the
south and southeast. In addition, grain from the
center-west and Matopiba is mainly transported by
trucks, which is typically more expensive than rail
or barges.
The distance to the ports and the relatively more
expensive mode of transportation has decreased the
competitiveness of Brazilian grain in the world market. In order to improve competitiveness, Brazil has
been working on expanding the capacity of ports
located in the north and developing cheaper and
more efficient modes of transportation (i.e. rail and
barges) to haul grain to the northern ports. Nowadays, around 20-25% of Brazilian grain is shipped
through the northern ports. The Brazilian govern-
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Figure 1: Agricultural areas in Brazil – Center-west (left) and Matopiba (right)
ment plans to expand this number to 40% by 2025. Transportation costs could be reduced since these ports in the
north are geographically closer to the center-west and Matopiba. Besides, they would be accessed more easily by
cheaper modes of transportation (rail and barges).

time, ports are so busy that it is not unusual to arrive at
the port and then wait for several days until the grain
can be unloaded, which adds to the cost of shipping
Brazilian grain to the world market and hence reduces
its competitiveness.

A study by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) discusses calculations of the cost of Brazilian grain to buyers in China and Europe. The numbers
indicate that shipping grain to these regions from the Brazilian center-west through the northern ports can already
be about 20% cheaper than shipping it through the southern ports. Besides, improving the ability to haul the grain
from the center-west and Matopiba to the northern ports
by rail or barges can further decrease this cost by 16-20%.
Therefore, shipping more grain through the northern ports
and improving the modes of transportation to reach those
ports can potentially make Brazilian grain more competitive in the world market.

This issue has become more relevant in recent years
because grain production started increasing faster than
storage capacity. Storage capacity in Brazil has increased from 88 million tons in 2000 to 166 million
tons in 2018, i.e. an increase of 88% in 18 years (or an
average increase of 3.6% per year). However, grain production in Brazil has increased faster during the same
period, going from 83 million tons in 2000 to 229 million tons in 2018. This represents a total increase of
176% or an average increase of 5.8% per year (Figure
2).

However, there is another dimension of the logistics system that also affects the competitiveness of Brazilian grain,
which is the deficit in storage capacity. An increasingly
larger portion of the Brazilian grain crop cannot be stored
because its volume exceeds storage capacity in the country.
The lack of storage forces producers to sell their grain faster, soon after harvest. The larger amount of grain to be
hauled at that time means higher transportation costs,
which affects the competitiveness of Brazilian grain as well
as the profits of producers. In addition, the large amount of
grain hauled to the ports at the same time also creates another problem for the logistics system which is the rising
waiting time to unload the grain at the port. At harvest

Since grain production has been increasing faster than
storage capacity, there has been a growing storage deficit (grain production minus storage capacity) in Brazil.
In the early 2000’s, the deficit was around 10-20 million
tons, i.e. around 10% of Brazilian grain production
could not be stored. In recent years, the deficit has
grown to 40-60 million tons, which means that approximately 20-30% of Brazilian grain production cannot
be stored because it exceeds storage capacity (Figures 3
and 4). In particular, the deficit is generally larger in
the center-west region and Matopiba. In the last few
years, storage capacity has corresponded to 50-55% of
total grain production in these areas. Not only is there
an increasing deficit in grain storage in Brazil, but also
this issue is more serious in two of the most important
agricultural areas in the country

Source: Data from CONAB1

Figure 2: Grain production and storage capacity in Brazil – 2000 to 2018
(million tons)

Source: Data from CONAB

Figure 3: Storage capacity deficit (grain production minus storage capacity) in
Brazil – 2000 to 2018 (million tons)

___________________________
1

CONAB (Brazilian Food Supply Company) is a public agency under the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock
and Supply (MAPA), responsible for the execution of Brazilian agricultural policies related to price support, public
storage, market supply and foreign trade. In addition, CONAB participates in the formulation of Brazilian government
agricultural policy.

Source: Data from CONAB

Figure 4: Proportion of grain production in Brazil that exceeds storage capacity –
2000 to 2018
The two points discussed here illustrate some of the challenges faced by Brazil to improve the competitiveness of its
grain in the world market. More data needs to be collected
and more research needs to be done to assess the real competitive advantage that Brazil may earn if the northern
ports become more active and storage capacity in the country increases. Basically, what is needed to accomplish these
goals is capital and a business plan. Brazil has historically
performed poorly when it comes to investments in infrastructure and development of solid business plans, particularly when the government is involved. However, there
have been improvements in the recent past, hence it is
worth watching closely how this story develops because it
has the potential to change the world grain market in the
future.
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